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Does better information about policy change voter attitudes? We ask and answer this
question with specific reference to redistributive policy, a core concern in the compara-
tive literature about advanced industrial democracies. Most scholars of political economy
have highlighted the potential for asymmetries in information to skew redistributive policy
towards the interests of the rich. We evaluate the causal impact of providing better infor-
mation through a field experiment by randomising the timing of receipt of a new policy
providing budget information to taxpayers.
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This pre-analysis plan submitted details our motivation and expectations, both grounded
in theoretical approaches from comparative political economy; and a detailed plan for the
implementation and analyses of the experiment. It also highlights some results from a
pilot (online survey) experiment which indicate that the findings may be somewhat sur-
prising. Given the nature of this project– the collaboration HMRC, with a major external
partner, the design also provides unique opportunity to document how the research process
is both enhanced and constrained by practical requirements, an angle not often emphasized
in scholarly treatments of research design, but critical for transparency of the scientific
process.
Information and Preferences Over Redistributive Policy: A Field
Experiment
1 Introduction
The importance of informed voters is a long-standing and disputed issue which draws atten-
tion from all subfields in political science. From a normative fear that voters may be un-
able (or unwilling, given their finite time) to shoulder the demands made by democratic the-
ory (Landemore2013 ), to classic empirical treatments asking how informed voters really are
(Converse; Caplan ), the idea that information matters is nearly unchallenged. This proposal
outlines an experimental empirical approach to answer the question: does better information
about policy change voter attitudes? We ask and answer this question with specific reference
to redistributive policy, a core concern in the comparative literature about advanced industrial
democracies.
A lack of voter information, particularly if skewed with income, may contribute to what
has become a common concern in both media and scholarly treatments of economic inequal-
ity. the lack of voice and representation of low income voters’ true interests may skew policy
in favour of the rich. While the ‘matter with Kansas’ may not be that poorer voters are dis-
tracted by religion (GelmanEtAl2008; Bartels2008a ), an extensive scholarly canon in both
American and comparative politics suggests that lack of voter information penalises redistribu-
tive egalitarian policies (Bartels2005; Bartels2008a; IversenSoskiceWSWP6; Arnold2012;
FowlerMargolis2014; FrankoTolbertWitko2013; Campbell2010 ).
But these claims are made typically without reference to a broader lack of consensus on
the claim that information matters overall, let alone with a specific direction in terms of policy
bias (Gilens2001; Bartels1996a; Druckman2005 ). Further, if voters do lack information, it is
unclear how easy it is to remedy the situation, as political learning appears to be very difficult
(NyhanReifler2010 ). In this research project we bring these two literatures together– along
with more serious attention to the informational content of the status quo, as highlighted in
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recent work by Mettler2011 and Gingrich2014
The wide range of interesting and plausible macro- political economy accounts of the links
between socioeconomic status, information, preferences and vote choice hangs on the individual-
level mechanism that greater information allows voters to better vote their economic interests;
the study we propose will ascertain whether or not even the most basic implications of this as-
sumption are true: does information alter preferences? Does it do so so as to bring them more
in line with (‘enlightened’) self-interest?
The means for plausibly answering these questions are an innovative field experiment in
collaboration with the British tax authority, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC).
HMRC are providing every income taxpayer in the country a tax statement summarising their
annual tax contribution and its distribution across various categories of government spending.
By randomising the receipt of this information for individuals matched within YouGov’s panel
of survey respondents, we can directly and experimentally determine whether this information
on the impact of government policy on individuals’ pocketbooks affects their views. The de-
livery of the information by the government’s own tax bureau also means that its credibility, as
well as the likelihood of compliance with the treatment, is greatly improved compared to other
assessments of the effect of information.
This study is also of more than academic interest. It was motivated by the apparent contra-
diction in the expected effect of information on attitudes implied by two different sets of policy
makers. In the United States, Democratic and liberal politicians have pushed for a federal tax re-
ceipt to provide information about all the benefits that government provides (PorterKendall2011
). The implicit reasoning is that once voters realise the value provided by government pro-
grams, they will be more supportive of them. In contrast, in the United Kingdom, Conservative
politicians have been the driving force behind the implementation of the tax receipts policy
(MontgomerieGummerProposal ), and their expected impact illustrated by the endorsement
of the policy by anti-tax campaign group the Taxpayers’ Alliance (TaxPayersAlliance ). That
is, both supporters and opponents of greater redistribution seem to think that once people have
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all the facts, attitudes will shift in their favour.1
In the next section we outline the theoretical framework according to which information
about the existing policy situation should be expected to change attitudes towards redistribu-
tion. This involves a more careful elaboration of the role of the status quo in considering the
determination of preferences than has hitherto been typical. However, the major contribution
of this project and the characteristics which make it an ideal example with which to illustrate
various issues surrounding research transparency lie in its empirical research design.
As intimated above, taxpayer receipts detailing taxpayers’ individual contribution to the
government budget, as well as a breakdown of how that money is allocated across spending
areas, have been rolled out (online) in the United States. In the United Kingdom, a paper version
of this information will be sent to 16 million taxpayers between October and December of this
year (2014). In collaboration with HMRC, the government bureau implementing this policy, we
will randomise receipt of the information within a representative subset of this population. This
experimental leverage, paired with the solicitation of attitudes about redistributive government
policy, will allow us to ascertain the causal impact of government-provided information about
taxing and spending on attitudes towards redistribution.
This design represents a major advance in its causal credibility relative to existing treat-
ments of redistribution preferences in the public at large, which tend to rely on observational
data (Margalit2013; LupuPontusson2011 ). Yet, as a field experiment, it also improves upon
studies on the impact of information, which tend to rely on experiments either in the lab, or
within a survey, for their leverage (Mettler2011; Gilens2001 ). This situates the study in a
uniquely advantageous point in the trade-off between internal and external validity. Discern-
ing the impact of information in the ‘real world’ is more relevant for policy-makers seeking to
change information levels in the population.
Moreover, with a clear theoretical motivation, and deductively derived hypotheses, we are in
a position to directly implement a transparent research design. Specifying our hypotheses in ad-
1Technically, they could both be right, if the US and UK status quo is located in a different place relative to
voters’ ideal positions. But if policy is skewed in different directions in the two countries, why is this so? At least
prima facie, there is a puzzle here.
3
vance, on the basis of the theoretical framework and refined by a pilot study already conducted,
we are able to demonstrate insulation from ‘p-value hacking’ under multiple comparisons. In
terms of transparency, the additional complications of implementing the study collaboration
with an external partner will provide a unique angle on adapting to ‘exogenous shocks’ to the
empirical research design.
In the next section we elaborate explicit hypotheses, and outline their theoretical basis. ??
outlines the design of the study and the analyses we plan in order to test our hypotheses. ??
outlines our expectations about feasibility, and outlines contingency plans in case the first-best
implementation is impossible. We then describe our pilot study and present its results and
implications for the power of the main study in ??. In lieu of established conclusions, ??
highlights the contributions that will be made by this study, particularly in the context of its
potential publication in the CPS special issue on Transparency.
2 Theory: Information and Redistributive Policy Preferences
Our expectations that information about the policy status quo should affect preferences seems
unobjectionable on its face. That is, at least at the extreme, if voters have no information what-
soever as to what government does or is able to do, then they will be unlikely to have any ability
to form preferences over policy. But in fact, the role of information about the existing policy
landscape has received only indirect attention in the theoretical literature on preferences towards
redistribution. Thus in this section we lay out explicitly the theoretical basis for this importance
of information about the status quo. There are four mechanisms by which understanding ex-
isting policy may affect preferences. The first fits easily into a stylized account of preference
formation which should be quite familiar, once we acknowledge the potential importance of
policy feedback effects. Information about the status quo may also allow voters to more directly
map their material interests in to the policy space. Third, existing policy information may af-
fect preferences because of important ways in which a ‘full’ spatial model of politics is overly
demanding: since most political reforms and proposals take the form of ‘increases’ or ‘de-
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creases’, the space in which political preferences are relevant is strongly anchored by the status
quo. Thus policy directions represent an important heuristic mechanism whereby the location
of the starting point becomes extremely important. We discuss each of these mechanisms in turn
before turning to the direct evidence that exists in the redistributive context. Finally, there may
be a mechanism operating at the level of voters’ expressed preferences, particularly in survey
questions, which also often focus on ‘increase’ or ‘decrease’ formulations.
First, a large literature on policy feedback effects notes the impact that existing policies can
have on individual attitudes. While much of this literature focuses on the effects of existing
policy in motivating citizens participation in politics, and mobilising particular constituencies,
the more relevant effects of policy here are on the ideas that citizens form about their personal
identities (Pierson1993 ), and in shaping perceptions about the appropriate role of government.
In this context, changes to policy may compel changes in attitude, “but this dynamism depends
on information reaching citizens” (Campbell2012a ). We would argue that this necessity for
information is not only at issue when policy changes, but that even when policy is stable, the
mechanisms by which citizens’ ideas are shaped by policy requires that they know about the
policy in the first place.
A second status quo operates through a slightly different channel, by changing material in-
terests of particular groups. The seminal example here is the creation of old-age Social Security
programs creating a committed constituency in favour of government action by virtue of the
material benefits that it generates (Campbell2003a ). On the other hand, such feedback can be
negative: interaction with the welfare system in the United States has been shown to generate
more mistrust of government than support (Soss ). Similarly, opinion may respond to existing
policy in a ‘thermostatic’ manner (Wlezien1995 ). In cases of benefit claimants, the relevant
‘information’ is their experience in dealing with program administrators. However, we argue
that informational effects of the status quo should also operate at less immersive levels. That
is, information that indicates to citizens whether or not they benefit from particular government
programs should change the way in which they match their material position to policy prefer-













Figure 1: A stylized model of preference formation. The diagram is not meant to be ‘complete’:
presumably personality and socialisation may also affect material position and thus material
interests, and so on. However, it captures the main ideas, to enable us to illustrate the location
of status quo effects via the ‘feedback effect’ and ‘material’ mechanisms. In particular, the
traditional ‘policy feedback effects’ of Pierson and Campbell would fit in the diagram in driving
the arrow between ‘ideational’ and ‘policy preferences’, as well as directly along the ‘material’
line in the figure. Information allowing voters to better situate their material interests relative to
the status quo (the ‘matching’ element in the diagram) is the logic associated with Bartels, or
Iversen and Soskice.
matching of interests to policies under higher information has been identified in survey exper-
iments at the level of specific policies (Mettler2011 ); and where more visible welfare states
provide more information about the delivery of benefits at the macro-level (Gingrich2014 ).
?? shows a stylized model of preference formation that summarizes these first two mecha-
nisms.
The other two mechanisms by which the status quo ought to affect policy preferences are
closely linked to one another, but subtly. Under classic spatial theories of policy competition,
voters need quite demanding estimates of positions– of parties and their own interests– in the
policy space. If we believe that voters are (at least somewhat) limited in their ability to go
through the complex calculations associated with the spatial model, then using the direction
from the status quo as a heuristic shortcut to deciding their own policy positions to the necessary
level of precision (RabinowitzMacDonald1989 ). Knowing the position of the status quo thus
becomes extremely important. Furthermore, even if voters do evaluate policy positions more
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comprehensively in the policy space, the location of the status quo provides a useful benchmark
or anchor.
This is related to the fourth and final mechanism by which we may measure changes in
attitudes in consequence of providing extra information to voters. Even without the anchoring
impact of the status quo, many survey questions used to gauge policy preferences take the
form akin to “Should government spending (on policy area X) increase, stay about the same,
or decrease?” In these contexts it is clear that the accurate perception– or at least a consistent
perception– of the status quo across individuals is required to interpret responses as meaningful
with regard to abstract positioning in the policy space (BeramendiRehm ). Although we use
questions of both this and the non-anchored type (see below), the distinction between the two
kinds of preference is quite subtle.
In previous studies of public attitudes, the status quo has been investigated usually with ref-
erence to public resistance to policy change (Hansen1998 ). However, our focus on the role
that the status quo may play turns more closely on the ability of individuals to find diagnostic
information in their current environment. KuklinskiEtAl2001 find that the combination of
general information about the need for trade-offs, combined with material motivation for good
decision making, improves policy choices in the sense of making respondents’ preferences more
consistent in the context of tradeoffs between existing goals. In our study, therefore, the ques-
tion is whether information about the status quo can provide such information and motivation
(McCallChin2013; Trump2013 ). In principle, since the tax amounts in particular are spe-
cific to the individual, this should provide material motivation. The spending information is
illustrative of the necessary tradeoffs required to allow tax reductions.
2.1 Budget Knowledge and Redistribution Preferences
How would we expect these general theoretical ideas to play out with concrete application to
redistributive policies? In particular, how does information on the budgetary status quo affect
these preferences?
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The general literature on information and preference formation has not typically attended to
the implications of policy information on individuals with different types of material interest.
The main exceptions to this have come from the political economy literature highlighted in the
introduction. Of particular interest in the context of our experiment, and the theoretical model
articulated above, is the role of better information in allowing voters to match their material
interests to policy choices.
In this vein, IversenSoskiceWSWP6 derive a formal argument whereby the provision of
information polarises public opinion. Under conditions of uncertainty, they argue,
“those with low information have a strong tendency to vote centrist (whatever their
true interest). We show analytically that this follows from a generalization of the
standard spatial voting model to cover limited information”.
Intuitively, under uncertainty a centrist position is closer than an extreme one, in expectation,
to an individuals’ true preference. With the provision of better information, then, voters ‘learn’
that in fact their interests are better represented by policy positions that lie more to the extremes.
The kind of information that should have this effect includes better information about what
taxes actually pay for, when the preference being elicited concerns the level and distribution
of taxation. Under ignorance about how much he pays in taxes and receives from benefits, an
individual may want to maintain the status quo for many reasons (Hansen1998 ). Depending
on the net gains or losses revealed by the details of where money is spent, with the provision
of information this individual may shift his position substantially. Essentially, the provision
of information allows voters to shift from the risk-minimising position to their ‘true’ interest;
and given that the former is the same (centrist) point for all, while the latter includes a wide
heterogeneity, better information should lead to polarisation in the sense of a greater number of
individuals being able to identify extreme positions as to their benefit, and doing so.
Secondly, it follows from this argument as well as others, that better information on the
budget should allow voters to align their expressed preferences with their material interests
(IversenSoskiceWSWP6; Bartels2008a ). For example, a low-income pensioner who thinks
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that their tax contribution goes largely to finance national defence may express preferences
more opposed to tax increases than her material position should suggest, given the reality of
the pension share in the total budget. Being apprised of this reality, she should be able to
express a preference over taxation that better reflects these material interests. Equally, voters
may be mistaken about how much tax they pay; by revealing this amount at the individual level,
matching the financial contribution to the perceived benefits on the spending side will better
enable preferences to reflect material reality.
To the extent that these kinds of mistakes and lack of information are unevenly distributed
across material positions, the aggregation of these heterogeneous effects may have an overall
bias. Given that low income voters are typically less well informed than higher income voters,
this may have a pro-redistribution impact on aggregate.
Finally, better information may also have an effect on preferences regardless of personal
position. Without accurate knowledge of status quo spending, voters may be unable to know
which policies help them materially, and which do not. For example, a heavy consumer of
healthcare and pensions (see ??) might not realise the implications of tax cuts on their material
position without knowing the extent to which these items dominate the government budget. This
kind of misperception– overlooking the degree to which they benefit from government spending
under the status quo– has been found to drive a lack of support for government intervention and
public policy in the United States, with better policy information increasing support for policies
that benefit the middle class, at the expense of those which disproportionately benefit the rich
Mettler2011
This is also where the ideational effects of policy are most likely to be relevant. If the
existence of public welfare programmes instills the belief that support for those who need them
is a proper role for government to play, then correcting over- or underestimation of the effort
that is actually dedicated to that goal will lead to changes in attitudes.
In the UK context, misperceptions of the extent of the government budget that goes on redis-
tributive programs has been argued to underpin support for radical reforms of unemployment
and disability benefits in the name of deficit reduction, despite the relatively small share of
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spending that these programs constitute (TaylorGooby2013 ).2 The first material mechanism
whereby policy information may shift attitudes, then, is if the material benefits of government
tax and spending policies are consistently underestimated, and better information rectifies this
misperception. This would be consistent with prior effects of information on British voters,
leading to greater support for higher taxes on high income voters (Sturgis2003 ). Recent ex-
perimental research from the United States also indicates a slight pro-government bias with the
provision of better information (PorterAPSA2013 ).
2.2 Hypotheses
We are now in the position to articulate the hypotheses to take to the data.
Following IversenSoskiceWSWP6 the impact of greater political information should be
polarising (since uncertain voters rationally vote centrist). Note that this is contra AlvarezBrehm2002
for whom additional information reduces variance in preferences due to the reduction in uncer-
tainty. The difference between the two expectations is the difference between within-individual
variance (which is the key conceptual element for the latter authors, and which should be re-
duced by reducing uncertainty) and between-individual heterogeneity, which is the more obvi-
ous focus of distributive politics, and of (IversenSoskiceWSWP6 ).
Hypothesis 1 The treatment group will have more polarised attitudes on redistributive policy
than the control.
The status quo ante of ‘unenlightened self-interest’ implies that this polarisation should
be predictable in terms of individual interests Gingrich2014; IversenSoskiceWSWP6. With
more information, higher income individuals should espouse greater resistance to redistribution;
lower income individuals should prefer more. The same sorting should apply to ideology, with
rightist respondents better able to align their general preference for less government intervention
2Unfortunately, the decision not to separate the more explicitly redistributive welfare policies from pension
expenditures in the HMRC figure was a decision that was taken at a political level far beyond our ability to
influence. In fact, spending on unemployment insurance, social exclusion and social protection comprise 30% of
this ‘welfare and pensions’ category (OBRTables ).
10
with the more redistribution-specific reductions in tax levels in the presence of information
about the status quo.
Hypothesis 2 Information on the policy status quo should increase the influence of interests
on attitudes towards redistribution. Specifically, (high) income should be a better predictor of
(disfavourable) views on redistribution in the high information (treatment) group.
Finally, if errors about the status quo are systematic, then the provision of information (fol-
lowing Gilens2001 ), the distribution of tax statements – which provide policy-specific infor-
mation about government’s redistributive efforts – may change the overall cast of preferences.
In light of the conflicting theories and we might not anticipate a particular directionality in
favour of more or less redistribution. We do not necessarily have strong theoretical priors about
the effect of information on the central tendency. If anything, the lower level of information
among the natural beneficiaries of expanding government programs implies that the aggregate
impact of these opposing shifts should be a shift in favour of redistribution. However, this is in
conflict with Gilens2001 finding that the impact of policy-specific information of attitudes is
greater among those with higher levels of general knowledge– assuming again that these high-
information individuals are relatively concentrated among the rich. Moreover, at least in the
British context, support for the provision of greater information via the tax statements has come
from anti-tax, anti-redistribution political actors. Thus policy-makers’ ‘hypothesis’ about the
direction of this effect certainly operates in the opposite direction to that which we derive from
the literature as:
Hypothesis 3 The provision of budget information (the treatment) may change attitudes to-
wards redistributive tax policy, shifting preferences in favour of more redistribution.
Thus, though the simplest of our hypotheses, this is also the one in which we have the weakest
theoretical support. However, in policy terms it is the most important open question, and speaks
directly to the puzzling contrast between pro-tax, liberal support for tax and spending informa-
tion in the American context, and anti-tax, Conservative support in the UK. Although we have
limited justification for anticipating an effect in either direction, the operating assumptions of
policy-makers do seem strongly premised on the idea that such information matters.
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3 Research Design: A Government Policy Field Experiment
As noted in the introduction, in January of 2012 the Conservative MP for Ipswich (in the UK)
made the case in parliament for a bill to be introduced legislating the provision of ‘tax state-
ments’, (also known in the US as ‘tax receipts’) to all taxpayers. This policy is being imple-
mented this autumn by the revenue collection agency, HMRC. Sixteen million Pay As You Earn
(PAYE) taxpayers will receive a paper statement detailing their personal contribution to the Ex-
chequer (via income tax and social security contribution, but not indirect nor other taxes).3 The
statements will also contain a breakdown of how that money was used by the government. An
example version of a tax statement, of the type to be used can be seen in ??.4 The government-
issued information will differ from this statement in its provenance (from the tax collection arm
of the government), increasing the credibility of its information. It will also be personalised to
the level of each individual’s total taxable income, and tax contribution.
The key intuition behind our design is to leverage the staggered roll-out of this information.
By randomly assigning a group of taxpayers to receive the statements (at the time we will elicit
their preferences) and a group to not (yet) receive them, we are able to manipulate exposure
to the information the statements contain. In other words, subjects in control will not yet have
received the treatment at the time they are surveyed; subjects in the treatment group will have
received the statements at this time.
HMRC are implementing the roll-out of the tax statements across the population over almost
two months in the autumn of 2014. A pilot round of 240, 000 statements will be delivered on
October 22nd, to help HMRC gauge the resources they may need to cope with any response
from recipients.5 Once this has been assessed, the full roll out will begin in November, and
just over 2.5 million statements per week will be distributed over the subsequent six week
timeframe.
3PAYE taxpayers comprise the bulk of employees in the UK. They typically do not have to file a tax return, but
rather taxes are withheld and any necessary adjustments based on final (employment) income are made by HMRC
at the end of the tax year.
4This is an example as used from the pilot study.
5Of particular concern to HMRC is that the summaries will be construed as demands for payment, and elicit
large volumes of enquiries for their customer relations centres.
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The information on this page shows you  how your Tax and National Insurance 
Contributions were spent in 2013-4. This does not include indirect taxes such 



























































































Figure 2: Example tax statement for an individual with an income of £37500 per year.
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By randomly selecting a group of individuals to be included in the pilot wave, we will
‘piggy-back’ on the pilot. The elicitation of attitudes is being implemented by YouGov, so the
treatment (and control) groups will be samples from their panel of respondents. By providing
HMRC with a list of YouGov respondents who must be included in the pilot wave, we are able
to know about the receipt of information without compromising taxpayer confidentiality.
In the context of information treatments that can be delivered in the field, this is a strong
intervention. The tax statement arrives in the form of a letter from HMRC, with two important
implications for compliance. First, the treatment group need undertake no active effort to get
the information. Second, letters from the national revenue collection agency are difficult to
ignore: often they contain important information about how much tax an individual should pay;
whether any errors have been made; or if auditing is necessary. Thus the legal authority of the
tax collectors stands behind the delivery of the information to the treatment group. In addition,
the official nature of the information (rather than information provided directly by researchers,
for example) makes it more credible and more important as an account of government activity.
3.1 Randomization and Data Collection
Our implementation strategy as of September 5th is outlined in ??. The only two major ob-
stacles to a clear implementation of our preferred design hinge on the matching capacity of the
HMRC information technology team, who are implementing the print run for the tax statements,
and ensuring appropriately informed consent from the respondents, given the information flows
involved. These points are highlighted in the diagram and will be resolved in the week of
September 15th.
The project will then proceed as follows (as per the chart):
1. we select a random subset of the YouGov panel, of about 13000 people. 8000 are ran-
domly assigned to the treatment condition, and their consent to the experiment is elicited.
2. YouGov release to HMRC the names and identifying details of these respondents. Name,
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first line of address, and six-digit postcode in the UK allows for a precise identification
of individuals, thus respondents must agree to have these details released by YouGov to
HMRC.
3. Based on these identifying characteristics, HMRC’s information systems team (‘Aspire’,
as in the flow-chart) will match the records of these respondents. Based on prior experi-
ence with matching to name, address, postcode characteristics, HMRC anticipate around
a 60 to 75 percent match rate, hence our over-recruitment for the target treatment group
size of 5000.
4. HMRC will indicate to YouGov which respondents they successfully matched, and in-
clude them in the pilot wave of the tax statement roll-out on October 22.
5. Between October 22 and November 3 (when the full roll-out begins), YouGov will survey
both our treatment and control groups.
We can straightforwardly check the balance of the treatment and control groups on the
demographic characteristics they have already contributed to the YouGov panel. The slightly
more problematic element is in ensuring compliance in the control group. Although they will
not have been deliberately assigned to it, some of the control group may in fact receive their
tax statements in the pilot wave. To match both groups’ records between HMRC and YouGov
is not something that HMRC believe is feasible, given the size of the overall policy for them
and their IT team. However, since the pilot group is a relatively small number of taxpayers, the
probability of any individual being included in the first wave is only 1.5%. We are also going to
ask whether respondents recall receiving the statement, at the end of our questionnaire eliciting
attitudes, and thus will be able to identify at least some of the ‘always-takers’ in the control
group. We should also know how many always takers receive a statement but do not report
recalling it from the comparable share in the treatment group. Thus, while this is problematic,
it is a small issue and one whose impact on our results can be estimated.
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Tax Statements Experiment: To-Do Flowchart
5th September, 2014 Lucy Barnes/Ethan Porter
IT Requirements Consent
(Distribution) (Data Collection)
Key: YouGov actions Both HMRC & YouGov
HMRC actions Flows of information
Determine identifying fields to 
match panel respondents
Recruit subjects with consent
 (1) to share ID information with HMRC
(2) for HMRC to share match status with YouGov 
List of recruited respondents
 to HMRC
Aspire/print run feasibility check:
(1) matching based on ID information
(2) Adding these ID'd individuals to 
(a) pilot distribution, or
(b) specific week's distribution
 in main run
List of fields to HMRC
Check on consent requirements for 
information flows as outlined here
Matching of respondents to HMRC records
Inclusion of respondents in pilot 240000
List of matched respondents 
to YouGov
Pilot statements distributed
Survey of matched respondents (treatment)
 and non-recipient sample (control)
Figure 3: September 5th Implementation Chart.
3.2 Ethics, Confidentiality and Experimental Registration
This project has been approved by the Internal Review Board at the University of Chicago for
the ethics implications. We are also bound to high standards regarding confidentiality as we
must conform to HMRC’s best practice, and YouGov’s standards for confidentiality.
Once the implementation has been finalised, we also plan to register the study with EGAP.
16
3.3 Operationalising Preferences
To measure preferences over redistribution we must attend to both attitudes about the overall
level of government activity, and views on the way that it is structured (Barnes2014 ). We focus
on attitudes towards taxation both because the statements are most directly framed around the
impact of revenue collection on the taxpayers, and because, for questions about the structure
of government redistributive efforts it is much more transparent how attitudes relate to redistri-
bution, compared to spending which are more often targeted based on ‘horizontal’ as well as
vertical characteristics.
We will thus focus on three questions directly tied to the redistributive impact of taxation.
First, we will ask respondents:
Generally, how would you describe the amount of taxes you pay overall? We mean
all taxes together, including income tax, National Insurance, VAT, Council Tax etc.
. Responses are solicited over a five point scale from ‘much too low’ to ‘much too high’. This
operationalisation mirrors that used by the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), so we
have an additional way to link to other studies to situate our descriptive findings.
Second, we will ask two questions to gauge attitudes towards progressivity between the
bottom and middle of the income distribution, and between the middle and the top. Having
provided an estimate of the average tax rate paid by the middle quintile (which is around 35%,
taking all taxes together including indirect taxation), we ask respondents about what the top and
bottom income quintiles should pay,
How much do you think a household in the top fifth of income (an average house-
hold income of £83,950 a year) should pay?
with the options:
1. Less than 10% (or, much less than the middle fifth)
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2. Between 10 and 30% (or, a little less)
3. Between 30 and 40% (or, about the same)
4. Between 40 and 60% (or, a little more)
5. Over 60% (or, much more)
We ask the question about the bottom quintile analogously, also providing the average income of
a household within that quintile to respondents. Note that in principle this gives us a cardinality
to the scale; though in practice we believe it will be most realistic to treat these as ordered
rather than numeric outcomes. We also use average incomes rather than focusing on marginal
rates, since these are both more intuitive (particularly in thinking about progressivity), and more
easily applied to the idea of total taxes across all tax types.
3.4 Analyses
The hypotheses that emerge from the theory involve different levels of empirical complexity
to test. Perhaps unsurprisingly, since the strongest theoretical expectations are about the most
precise empirical relationships, the strongest theoretical implications (hypothesis 1) is the most
complicated to test, and the weakest prediction (hypothesis 3) the simplest.
However, the clear theoretical basis makes the empirical comparisons very obvious, even
where their implementation is relatively complex. This allows us to specify the intended com-
parisons in advance, to consider the required power of the study, and the necessary corrections
for multiple comparisons.
3.4.1 Hypothesis 1: Polarization
The expectation that providing information about the nature of government spending (and thus
redistribution) should increase the variance in preferences over redistribution turns out to be the
most complicated hypothesis in empirical terms.
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Reducing Outlier Responses
We are able to apply two techniques to testing the idea that information has a polarising
effect on preferences (including for the pilot study)– the first involves outlier responses, while
the second uses quantile regression. In case of the impossibility of fitting appropriate variance
components models (see below), we thus retain leverage over the first empirical hypothesis.
First, we follow AnsolabehereMeredithSnowberg2014 in using outlying responses as a
measure of the variation in attitudes. Higher polarization implies an larger share of ‘outlier’
responses on the preference questions. Thus there should be fewer such outliers in the control
group if, as per hypothesis 1, information increases polarization. Given that our outcomes
are measured on a five-point scale, these outliers do not necessarily have direct substantive
implications but are an indication of diversity of attitude. Since we can code outlying responses
into two categories (outliers, and not), this yields a relatively simple empirical specification.
Second, we can use quantile regression to ascertain if the treatment has different effects on
individuals located at different points in the (potential) distribution of outcomes. This follows a
large econometric literature on the estimation of heterogeneous treatment effects. In our case,
the interest in polarisation implies that the treatment should have a ‘bigger’ effect at higher
quantiles. Note that the interpretation of quantile treatment effects not as indicating that the
same individuals who were ‘high’ before are now even higher, but that the high group as a
whole is shifted out, is in fact more consistent with our theoretical motivation than the other
(erroneous) interpretation.
3.4.2 Hypothesis 2: Treatment × Income
The second of our theoretical hypotheses is, essentially, that the treatment effect should vary
with income. We expect that the provision of information that indicates to respondents whether
they benefit or lose from spending should allow them to update their preferences over taxation
to reflect that reality. Given the overall redistributive slant of spending, those with high incomes
who receive the treatment should be less supportive of high tax rates in general, and on them-
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selves; for those with low incomes the treatment should, conversely, have the opposite pattern.
For taxes on those with low incomes the predictions are more ambiguous (since higher taxes on
the poor paying for extra spending is ambiguous in distributive terms). Thus although we can
analyse this outcome, for completeness, we have no strong expectations deriving from theory.
To ascertain whether these differential effects by income are observed in the data, we can
both (a) consider any effects of the interaction between treatment and income in classical re-
gression models; (b) model the treatment as a random effect, with the slope varying according to






= αj − τzi − γ(zi × incomei)− βxi − εi (1)
Random Effects Models
In order to consider heterogeneous treatment effects by income group, we can divide re-
spondents into income quintile based on the information in their profile. We use quintiles to
divide respondents since the questions that we are interested in also focus on the relative tax
burden on different income quintiles, and because respondents are more likely to be able to
accurately place themselves in income quintiles than in smaller groups. Under these analyses





= αj − τzi − βxi − γq[i] − ψq[i]zi − εi (2)
where q indexes income quintiles, and thus ψq[i] represents the treatment effect on a particular
income group. We use a standard varying intercept-varying slope hierarchical model to estimate
treatment effect heterogeneity across income quintile.
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3.4.3 Hypothesis 3: Average Intent-to-Treat Effect on Preferences over Redistribution
The notion that providing information about the spending status quo should lead to support
for higher levels of taxes is the weakest of our hypotheses, predicated on the idea that without
the provision of information, voters tend to overestimate the level of taxation, or to under-
appreciate the usefulness of the spending programs it pays for. Equally, and most important
for our questions about the structure of taxation (the burden on the rich and poor, relative to
the middle), voters may overestimate the degree to which spending is focused on the poor, and
so when given better information, think that the tax structure should reflect that, reducing the
amount that the poor are perceived to owe, and increasing that of the rich.
This idea lends it to very straightforward empirical expectations based on the average treat-
ment effect for all of our three outcome variables: with the provision of information in the
treatment condition, respondents should assess the overall levels of taxation as lower, relative
to their ideal– a positive treatment effect under our coding of the tax levels variable. This same
average effect should be seen for the level of taxes on the rich. For the level of taxation borne by
the first income quintile, relative to the middle, hypothesis 3 entails a negative average treatment
effect.
Assuming that our randomisation strategy is effective, the analyses required to identify the
effect of begin assigned to the treatment are fairly straightforward. We consider the difference
between the preferences of those who received the tax statement to those of individuals who
received no such information. We can compare outcomes in the raw data, and with regres-
sion analyses using the covariates available in respondents’ YouGov profiles to improve the
efficiency of the estimates. Since our outcome variables are ordered responses, simple com-
parisons of means is improved upon by modelling the ordered (but not cardinal) nature of the
outcomes explicitly; thus we use ordered logistic specifications to model the data.
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4 Contingency Plans
Given that the implementation of our intended design is somewhat complicated, we have two
backup strategies to allow us to learn something from the distribution of the tax statements.
The main uncertainty remaining centres on our ability to match the individuals in the YouGov
survey with HMRC’s tax records, either due to limitations in the matching process, or because
of confidentiality and consent problems. Thus we have two ideas that do not rely on this linkage.
First, we may be able to exploit as-if random of assignment to the pilot wave; secondly, without
any information from HMRC, we can use an encouragement design.
4.1 Plan B: As-if-random Distribution Characteristics
In the absence of our intervention, selection to the pilot wave of 240,000 will be based on the
digits of individuals’ National Insurance (NI) number (akin to the Social Security number in the
United States). Individuals who meet the criteria for inclusion in the population to receive the
statement will be allocated to the scheduling of the roll-out based on the last two digits of their
NI number. These last two digits are as-if random.
However, the last two digits of the NI number is not a piece of information that YouGov has
about their panellists. Thus to pursue this design, we would need to recruit within the YouGov
sample based on individuals’ willingness and ability to provide this detail. Unlike in the United
States, the NI number is not a widely used nor required piece of information, so individuals
who can provide their digits may be quite unrepresentative of the population as a whole– likely
people who have moved jobs recently, or do so frequently. Most damagingly for our purposes,
otherwise similar people who have had greater contact with government benefits and services
may be more likely to recall their NI number. In addition, asking for this potentially sensitive
detail may make recruitment to the study much more difficult, and thus reduce our sample size
considerably.
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4.2 Plan C: Encouragement Design
If HRMC changes course and resists participating in the experiment as described, we have a
two-pronged back up plan in place. The first part of the backup plan is a standard encouragement
design. Sometimes used by researchers interested in teasing out the causal effects of treatments
that would be unethical to deprive of subjects of (McDonald et al 1992), or when the treatment in
question cannot be effectively randomized (AlbertsonLawrence2009 ), encouragement designs
proceed by randomly assigning subjects to receive (or not) an encouragement to comply with
the treatment. In our case, when statements begin to roll out in November, all subjects will
be randomly assigned to one of three encouragement conditions. In condition 1, the strong
encouragement conditions, subjects will receive a strongly worded message that tells them to
be on the look out for the statement that will soon be arriving in their mailboxes. In condition
2, the weak encouragement condition, subjects will receive a message previewing a number
of major national events due to occur over the next month, including the distribution of the
statements. In condition 3, the no-encouragement conditions, subjects will not receive any
encouragement. (Subjects in conditions 1 and 2 will receive their encouragement at the same
time, when the statements are beginning to be mailed.) Then, after the statements have all been
mailed, subjects in all three conditions will be surveyed about their redistributive preferences.
In this case, we will be able to observe the causal effects of being randomly encouraged to read
one’s statement. If there are differences between the conditions, we will be able to draw the
credible inference that they are due to differences in compliance caused by the encouragement.
The second part of our backup strategy relies on particular knowledge about the distribution
of the statements. To set the mailing schedule for the statements, HMRC has created an algo-
rithm that effectively randomizes the population. Every week for the six weeks that HMRC is
distributing the statements, we will conduct a survey of different subjects. At the end of each
survey, all subjects will be asked if they recall receiving their receipt, and then divided into
treatment and control accordingly. As suggested by SoveyGreen2011 to increase the validity
of these self-reports we will ask subjects who report receiving the statements some elementary
recall questions about their content. Subjects enrolled in the encouragement design will also an-
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swer questions meant to test their recall. Though suboptimal, this back-up strategy will provide
substantive insight into the causal effects of the statements.
5 Results from a Pilot Survey Experiment
To ascertain the feasibility of the field experiment, and to road-test the survey questions, we
administered a pilot survey experiment between the 14th and 18th of August, 2014. The survey
was administered by YouGov. In it, 533 respondents in the treatment condition were shown
an approximation of the tax statement that they would receive from HMRC (as illustrated in
the example ?? above). An equally sized control group (497 respondents) did not see any
information. We then asked the same set of questions as outlined above, and as planned for the
field experiment.
Obviously there are a number of critical ways in which this pilot differs from the final ex-
periment. First, the treatment was administered online, rather than by letter. While this obviates
some concern about compliance (we do not need to worry about statements lost in the mail, for
example), it primarily introduces differences in the way that individuals may have responded
to the information (AckermanGoldsmith2011 ). Second, our pilot study was conducted in-
dependently from HMRC, so the statements neither bore the imprimatur of the government
agency, nor were they personalised by income beyond showing individuals the tax payments
for an individual at the mid-point of the household income category reported by the respon-
dents to YouGov. For both of these reasons the credibility and relevance of the information in
the treatment was lower in the pilot than it will be in the main experiment.
Despite these limitations, the results are instructive, and discussed below.
5.1 Outcome Variance
As the analytical techniques necessary to ascertain effects on the variance are more demanding
both in terms of the number of observations required, and in terms of the statistical techniques
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involved, so far we can present only the first set of results– the indirect results– from the pi-
lot study. We classified the extreme responses (‘Much too high’ and ‘Much too low’ for the
tax amount question, and ‘Much less’ and ‘Much more’ in the relative tax burden questions
for the top and bottom income quintiles) as outliers, and modelled these responses in logis-
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Figure 4: Coefficient estimates of the treatment effect on the probability of giving an outlier
response to the three tax preference questions. Estimates derived from logistic regression mod-
els with controls for income, income2, gender, age. Dark grey bars represent 95% confidence
intervals.
The essential results, as indicated in ??, is that the pilot study provides no evidence that
information has a polarising effect on attitudes. The 95% confidence intervals overlap zero
effect for both outlying responses on the overall level of taxation and for the top quintile; and
in the latter case the point estimate itself is extremely close to no effect. Only for taxes on the
bottom quintile does the treatment appear to affect the likelihood of outlier responses, but here
it is in the opposite direction from the theoretical prediction: those in the treatment condition
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are less likely to espouse extreme attitudes. However, given the initial distribution of outliers in
this last category, it is impossible to ascertain whether this is a true ‘variance’ effect rather than
a ‘level’ effect, as 542 of the 545 extreme responses are respondents claiming that the bottom
quintile should pay ‘Much less’, and only three espousing ‘Much more’.6 On the other hand,
this pattern is consistent with the idea that better information can reduce uncertainty for voters
(AlvarezBrehm2002 ).
5.2 Treatment × Income
Plotting our outcomes according to income and treatment status gives a first insight into the data.
For both questions about the overall level of taxation, and of bottom incomes versus the middle,
income has some effect but no difference between treatment and control groups is apparent (a
finding repeated in more involved analyses below). However, for attitudes towards the relative
tax rates at the top, we see (just) a discernible gap between the treated and control groups at low
levels of income, using lowess smoothed predictions and their confidence intervals.
At low income levels we see not only that the treated group is more favourable towards
higher taxes on the rich, but also that the slope of the two lines differs, such that the relative po-
sitions switch. This indicates that (at these low levels of income), in the control group increasing
income increases support for high taxes on the rich, in opposition to the material interests of
these individuals. Further, although these individuals are concentrated in the far left of the fig-
ure, the income levels involved here encompass the majority of the population. In the treatment
group, there is less of the ‘wrong’ reaction of preferences to increasing incomes, providing par-
tial support to the idea that the policy information allows lower income voters better to align
their attitudes with their material position.
Beyond the simple visualisation of the raw data, we can investigate hypothesis 2 with ref-
erence to models interacting the treatment with income levels. The most straightforward way
6In light of this, if we take advocating higher taxes on the bottom quintile as outliers, categorising ‘About the
same’, ‘More’, and ‘Much more’ responses as outlying on the basis that they empirically rarely observed, rather
than theoretically at the extreme of the possibilities, the estimated treatment effect is β = 0.10, but with a standard
error of 0.24, so again indistinguishable from zero.
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Figure 5: Support for higher levels of taxation on the top income quintile, by income and
treatment status. Lines indicate smoothed lowess predictions; shaded areas represent 95% con-
fidence intervals.
to do this is to model the attitude outcomes as dependent on the treatment, income, and their
interaction in classical ordered logistic models. The results from such models are presented in
??.
This strategy reveals no evidence of a significant interaction in the determination of prefer-
ences over the overall level of taxation (columns 1 to 3), nor the preferred rates of taxation on
the bottom quintile. However, it does appear that the provision of information has a differential
effect on attitudes towards taxes on the richest quintile, depending on the respondent’s income
level. Specifically, the interaction between income and the treatment is negative, indicating that
at higher incomes, the positive baseline impact of the treatment is muted. The precise interpre-
tation of the magnitude of these effects is not transparent given the ordinal modelling strategy
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DV: Overall Bottom fifth Top fifth
Model: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Treatment 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.41 0.36 0.41 0.70 0.71 0.71
t value.7 0.59 0.56 0.37 1.22 1.06 1.13 2.27 2.29 2.16
Treatment × Income -1.23 -1.19 -0.73 -0.06 0.24 -0.18 -4.81 -4.85 -5.19
-0.59 -0.57 -0.33 -0.03 0.10 -0.07 -2.27 -2.29 -2.34
Treatment × Income2 2.17 2.07 1.53 -0.67 -1.26 -0.85 3.23 3.33 4.44
0.80 0.77 0.54 -0.23 -0.42 -0.28 1.18 1.22 1.55
Income 1.84 1.66 1.75 3.46 2.74 3.14 3.87 3.98 4.40
1.24 1.11 1.09 2.05 1.60 1.77 2.51 2.56 2.70
Income2 -1.81 -1.66 -1.98 -3.00 -2.57 -2.65 -4.10 -4.25 -5.16
-0.93 -0.85 -0.96 -1.41 -1.20 -1.20 -2.07 -2.13 -2.43
Male 0.09 -0.01 0.11 0.15 -0.11 -0.14
0.72 -0.06 0.81 1.03 -0.91 -1.05
Age -0.40 -0.42 -2.72 -3.13 0.05 0.44
-1.03 -1.01 -6.49 -6.96 0.13 1.05
Information 0.70 -0.55 0.56
3.18 -2.31 2.59
N 967 967 837 923 923 820 920 920 811
AIC 2175 2177 1893 1752 1713 1504 2313 2316 2036
Table 1: Coefficients from ordinal logistics regression results of the interaction effects between
income and the treatment. Italic values are t-values.
and the presence of the higher-order income terms, but ?? illustrates the patterns in the expected
values.
Here we can see the impact of information is completely different at the high and low in-
come groups. For the bottom income quintile, the treatment group sees many more individuals
advocating higher taxes on the rich than on the middle quintile (the fourth diamond is much
higher than the fourth circle). In contrast, in the top income group this pattern is reversed. In
both cases the ‘action’ seems to be coming from the same place, that is, with fewer ‘about the
same’ and ‘lower’ responses under treatment (control) for the bottom (top) quintile.
The second possibility is to consider particular income levels as groups by which the effect
of the treatment might vary in a random effects model. Adopting this approach (not reported
here for reasons of space) reinforces the conclusions implied by the interaction models: that









































































Figure 6: Predicted (fitted value) probabilities of each view on the relative burden the top quin-
tile should bear, for the bottom and top income quintiles under treatment and control. Solid
diamonds and dashed lines indicate treatment and open circles with dotted lines are control
group averages.
5.3 Average Treatment Effect on Preferences
Finally, we consider the average treatment effect on preferences, again for the three outcomes of
interest: attitudes towards the overall level of taxation; and those towards high and low incomes
relative to middle incomes. For reasons of space, we do not present the full results, but only
that where we see an effect in the pilot data. Here, there is no evidence of an overall treatment
effect on attitudes towards overall levels of taxation, nor on attitudes towards taxing the rich
more aggressively than the middle. In contrast, we do see support for taxes on the first income
quintile differing, as illustrated in ??.
The pilot data thus indicates that, contrary to the literature, but in keeping with plausible
Conservative party strategy in rolling out the tax statements immediately before the election,
that the direction of the effect of information on preferences overall is in the direction of de-
creasing support for progressivity– but in the guise of leading to calls for higher (relative) taxes
on lower incomes rather than lower taxes at the top. In contrast, the effects on support for higher


















Much less Much more
About 
 the same More Much more
Bottom fifth taxes compared to middle fifth
Control
Treatment
Figure 7: Share of respondents supporting different relative rates of taxation on the bottom
income quintile, by treatment status. Vertical lines (in blue and red) represent 95% confidence
intervals.
tailed budget information, which gives detailed information both on the level of spending (in
terms of an individual’s tax contribution) and its distribution (across spending areas) seems to
have more obvious effects on attitudes towards the shape of government policy than its overall
size.
5.4 Power Implications from the Pilot Study
We plan to conduct a formal power analysis for the final pre-analysis plan. Even based on back-
of-the-envelope calculations, however, this experiment is very well powered. In particular,
we can assume 5,000 individuals in each treatment condition and a set of predictive baseline
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covariates that explains around 15 percent of the residual variance, in line with the data from the
pilot study. For a binary outcome, such as our outlier status measure, a conservative calculation
for the Minimal Detectable Effect is around two percentage points. Therefore, even if the main
effects remained the same as in the pilot study, we would have the power to detect changes in
outlier share that are of the same order as the pilot estimates for total tax amount, and for taxes
on the bottom quintile (in percentage point terms, these are approximately a three-point change
for amount, and a nine-point change for bottom quintile taxes).
6 Contribution
First, we make explicit the extension of voter ignorance and political information to the inclu-
sion of the policy status quo, as well as the position of parties (Downs1957 ) or voters’ own
preferences (AlvarezBrehm2002 ). Although the idea of voter uncertainty about the status quo
has received some attention in theoretical treatments (Banks1990 ), it has been less explicitly
attended to in empirical analyses of public opinion.
Second, and more significantly, the results of our field experiment will provide impor-
tant evidence on the effect of information on preferences over redistribution. The most basic
assumption– not easy to test– is that information in general will change (at least some) voters’
attitudes towards policy. But even this has not been conclusively demonstrated, as the impervi-
ousness of voters to new (especially disconfirming) evidence shows (NyhanReifler2010 ).
Thus in empirical terms we provide an extension of Gilens2001 and most of the existing
work on information in the provision of the relevant information in the field rather than in a
purely experimental setting. If the finding that information matters to policy preferences has
real-world implications, we need to know whether information levels are in fact amenable to
intervention. Although a single-country study, our findings will highlight some of the assump-
tions, and assess some of the implications, of recent work situated centrally in comparative
politics (for example, Gingrich2014 ).
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The major strength of our study is in its field experimental design. This allows us to go
beyond the impact of informational survey or laboratory treatments in order to consider the
effects of information in the real world, where the context is much different. Substantively,
competition for scarce attention, and the difficulty of translating information seen in one context
to another are two important differences between the provision of information and the creation
of informed voters.
Methodologically, not only is this important in helping to gauge the external validity of
previous experiments on information effects, it also allows us to draw conclusions about real
policy initiatives designed to inform voters about the government budget. Such initiatives are
currently underway in both the UK and US. This contribution is reinforced by the nesting of a
survey experiment– our pilot study– within the full design. Thus our design sits in a ‘sweet spot’
in terms of a rigorous experimental approach in a substantively important, real-world context.
The tension in political science research between answering questions of real theoretical impor-
tance, and answering them with a credible identification strategy, motivates the ambitious nature
of the proposal, and justifies the additional efforts involved in collaboration with government
actors on a national-level policy.
In terms of transparency, this ambitious and original research design will provide an addi-
tional insight into the process of empirical political research. The implementation implications
of collaboration with external partners on such a scale does represent a potential source of mod-
ifications to the design that are beyond the researchers’ control– but assessing policy in the field
speaks with much more directness to the theoretical questions of interest, for reasons of external
validity. The methodological challenges involved in the trade-off between internal validity and
the implementation of empirical research that tracks important, theoretically motivated ques-
tions, will be directly documented through this project.
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